

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee

* SECOM-D-274
15 November 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECOM Members

FROM:


Chairman

SUBJECT: Revision of DCID 1/14

1. At the 23 October meeting of the Security Committee, members discussed and generally agreed to the proposed revision of DCID 1/14 to cover off-duty activities of security concern. Mr. Robinson tabled a Department of State suggestion to place more emphasis on the requirement to review and report outside employment of activity of potential security concern, especially those outside involvements subject to the reporting requirements of the Foreign Agent Registration Act. The first paragraph of the proposed addition to section 11 of DCID 1/14 has been amended in response to the State suggestion.


2. Also included in the attached proposed revisions of DCID 1/14 are some minor language changes to Annex A which have been agreed to by the SECOM Personnel Security Subcommittee. The changes in this area are underlined.

3. Members are requested to review these proposals and to provide the staff their written concurrences or comments not later than 4 December 1985.



Attachment:
Proposed revisions of DCID 1/14

STAT



1 November 1985

New paragraph for DCID 1/14

11. Outside Activities

Individuals who hold or are being considered for one or more SCI access approvals must be required to read the second and third paragraphs of the section of Annex A to DCID 1/14 which is captioned "Outside Activities," and instructed to report in writing to their cognizant security officer any existing or contemplated outside employment or activity which appears to meet the criteria of those paragraphs. Such individuals also must be instructed to report all activity or association subject to reporting under the Foreign Agent Registration Act. The required written report must be made before beginning any outside employment or activity of concern (as defined in Annex A to DCID 1/14). In the case of individuals being considered for SCI access approval which requires initial or updated personnel security investigative coverage, reporting on outside activities (as defined in Annex A to DCID 1/14) must be made on or with personal history statements or other documentation providing personal data.

Information concerning actual or planned outside employment or activities which would create a potential risk to the security of SCI shall be evaluated in accordance with the factors specified in Annex A to determine whether the circumstances create an unacceptable risk of unauthorized disclosure.

Annex A to DCID 1/14

Add to the list of matters which must be scrutinized by adjudicators (p. 7 of the DCID): "Involvement in outside activities"

Add a new section at the end of Annex A (p. 11 of the DCID package) captioned: "OUTSIDE ACTIVITIES"

"Involvement in non-US Government or non-US Government contracted employment or activities which raise potential conflicts with an individual's responsibility to protect classified information is of security concern and must be evaluated to determine whether the conflict is of such a nature that SCI access should be denied or revoked.

"Employment which must be reported would be service (whether or not compensated) with any foreign government or national, with a representative of any foreign interest, or with any foreign, domestic or international organization or person engaged in analysis, discussion or publication of material on intelligence, defense or foreign affairs.

"Activities which must be reported would be close or continuing contact with foreign nationals; association with nationals of Communist countries or countries hostile to the United States; membership in organizations which have as members nationals of Communist countries or countries hostile to the United States when the membership involves contact with those nationals; and sponsorship of the entry of aliens into the United States.

"Adjudicators of new SCI access approvals shall carefully consider whether an individual's outside activities may pose a conflict with his or her security responsibilities that could result in his or her disclosing classified information to unauthorized persons. Any doubt as to an individual's willingness or ability to safeguard classified information shall be resolved by denying SCI access.

"Reports from individuals approved for SCI access or from other sources concerning outside employment or activities of security concern shall be evaluated carefully by cognizant security officials to determine if SCI access should be continued. When an individual's outside employment or activity raises doubts as to the individual's willingness or ability to safeguard classified information, he or she shall be advised that continuing that employment or activity may result in withdrawal of SCI access, and be given an opportunity to discontinue. If the individual terminates the outside activity of security concern, his or her SCI access approval(s) may be continued, provided that this is otherwise consistent with national security requirements and necessary for the performance of assigned duties."

Annex C to DCID 1/14 (or separate document superseding it)

Add the following:

All individuals nominated for or holding SCI access approval(s) shall be notified initially and annually thereafter of their responsibility to report to their cognizant security officers outside employment or activities (described in DCID 1/14, Annex A) which could conflict with their duty to protect classified information from unauthorized disclosure. Any other outside employment or activities which individuals have reason to believe could create real or apparent conflicts with their responsibility to protect classified information also must be reported. Individuals granted SCI access approvals shall be advised:

- (1) whom they may consult to determine if particular outside employment or activity might be of security concern;
- (2) of the need to exercise security caution in their activities as members of professional, commercial, scholarly or advocacy organizations that publish or discuss information on intelligence, defense or foreign affairs; and
- (3) of their continuing obligation to submit for prepublication review any planned articles, books, speeches or public statements which contain or purport to contain SCI or information relating to or derived from SCI, as specified by the nondisclosure agreements which are a prerequisite for access to SCI.

DCID Annex A

SEXUAL CONSIDERATIONS

DCID 1/14 requires that, to be eligible for SCI access, individuals must be stable, of excellent character and discretion, and not subject to undue influence or duress through exploitable personal conduct.

Sexual promiscuity, prostitution, extra-marital relations, and any immoral or notorious sexual conduct are of legitimate concern to the SCI adjudicator where such conduct reflects a lack of judgment and discretion or when the conduct offers the potential for undue influence, duress or exploitation by a foreign intelligence service.

Deviant sexual behavior can be a relevant consideration in circumstances in which it indicates flawed judgment or a personality disorder, or could result in exposing the individual to direct or indirect pressure because of susceptibility to blackmail or coercion as a result of the deviant sexual behavior. Such behavior includes, but is not limited to, bestiality, fetishism, exhibitionism, necrophilia, nymphomania or satyriasis, masochism, sadism, pedophilia, transvestism, and voyeurism. Homosexual conduct is also to be considered as a factor in determining an individual's judgment, discretion, stability and susceptibility to undue influence or duress.

In examining cases involving sexual conduct of security significance, such as those described above, it is relevant to consider the age of the person, the voluntariness, and the frequency of such activities, the public nature and the recency of the conduct, as well as any other circumstances which may serve to aggravate or mitigate the nature of character of the conduct. A recommendation for disapproval is appropriate when, in view of all available evidence concerning the individual's history of sexual behavior, it appears that access to SCI could pose a risk to the national security.

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Revision of DCID 1/14

03 REPLY
03 REPLY
FILE leg-8
DCID 1/14

FROM:

Policy Branch/PPG
Office of Security

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

6 December 1985

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1.

C/Policy Branch

12/10

ES

2.

3.

C/PPG

12/10

mhu

4.

5.

DD/P&M

12/10

12/11

D

6.

C / PPG

mhu

7.

DB/S

12/12/85

MDW

8.

mailed

12/11

BE

9.

DB/S

Registry

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

--WARNING NOTICE--
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
OR METHODS INVOLVED

15.

Attached is a response to
SECOM regarding subject. Basic
attachment includes OGC
comments.

SECOM agreed to slip deadline.
ES.

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) SECOM: Revision of DCID 1/14

FROM:

Policy Branch/PPG
Office of Security

EXTENSION

NO.

27 November 1985.

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S
INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. C/PPG

2.

3. DD/PSI

4.

5. C/SSC

6.

7.

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--WARNING NOTICE--
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
OR METHODS INVOLVED

Attached is SECOM tasking regarding subject. Please review this draft and provide comments or concurrence to PPG by cob 3 December 1985.

Questions maybe directed to

SSC has no
objection to proposed
revision.